Marcus Steinweg: A note on power

The topoi of ignorance and the unconscious (by no means identical: the unconscious implies knowledge that I am unaware of, while the ignorance, that Nietzsche speaks of should be the object of not only my knowledge but also my will) evoke a certain dispossession with regard to the Subject, a kind of ontological poverty that defines it as naked life or empty cogito; in brief, as a Subject without subjectivity. While the Subject of idealism defines itself by being part of a universal we-subjectivity and the Subject of Christianity understands itself to be the ens creatum of a creator, the Subject without subjectivity is an original decapitated Subject. Open to the top and the bottom, without telos, without foundation. Its hyperbolism defines this openness, which allows it to border on the infinite. Philosophy confronts itself in all its historical moments with the infinite parts of the Subject to ultimately (in the metaphysical critique phase) hold out the prospect of a notion of enlightenment enlarged to include this infinity: a new enlightenment, as Nietzsche says, a new Subject and a different rationality that recognise their hyperbolism, or quite simply their blind power.

Complete text will be published at: Note on power

Leave a Reply